Investment and Consumption with Regime-Switching Discount Rates by Pirvu, Traian & Zhang, Huayue
ar
X
iv
:1
30
3.
12
48
v1
  [
q-
fin
.PM
]  
6 M
ar 
20
13
Investment and Consumption with Regime-Switching Discount
Rates ∗
Traian A. Pirvu
Dept of Mathematics & Statistics
McMaster University
1280 Main Street West
Hamilton, ON, L8S 4K1
tpirvu@math.mcmaster.ca
Huayue Zhang
Dept of Finance
Nankai University
94 Weijin Road
Tianjin, China, 300071
hyzhang69@nankai.edu.cn
July 5, 2018
Abstract. This paper considers the problem of consumption and investment in a financial market
within a continuous time stochastic economy. The investor exhibits a change in the discount rate.
The investment opportunities are a stock and a riskless account. The market coefficients and
discount factor switch according to a finite state Markov chain. The change in the discount rate
leads to time inconsistencies of the investor’s decisions. The randomness in our model is driven by
a Brownian motion and a Markov chain. Following [7] we introduce and characterize the subgame
perfect strategies. Numerical experiments show the effect of time preference on subgame perfect
strategies and the pre-commitment strategies.
Key words: Portfolio optimization, time inconsistency, subgame perefect strategies, regime-
switching discounting
JEL classification: G11
Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 91B30, 60H30, 60G44
∗Work supported by NSERC grants 371653-09, 88051 and MITACS grants 5-26761, 30354 and the Natural
Science Foundation of China (10901086).
1
1 Introduction
Dynamic asset allocation in a stochastic paradigm received a lot of scrutiny lately. The pioneer
works are [15] and [16]. Many works then followed, most of them assuming an exponential discount
function. [7] has given an overview of the literature in the context of Merton portfolio management
problem with exponential discounting.
In this paper we consider a regime switching model for the financial market. This modeling
is consistent with some cyclicality observed in financial markets. Many papers consider these
types of markets for pricing derivative securities. Here we recall only two such works, [10] and [9].
When it comes to optimal investment in regime switching markets we point to [1], [5] and [19].
All these papers consider a constant rate of time preference.
In our paper the discount rate is stochastic, exogenous and depends on the regime. By
the best of our knowledge it is the first work to consider stochastic rates of time preference
within the Merton problem framework. In a discrete time model [18] considers a cyclical discount
factor. Next we motivate this modeling approach of discount rates. The issue of time discounting
is the subject of many studies in financial economics. Several papers stepped away from the
exponential discounting modeling, and based on empirical and experimental evidence proposed
different discount models. In fact models with time varying discount rates have a long history,
going back to Bo¨hm-Bawerk (1889) and Fisher (1930). More recent works like [4] and [11] show
that economic and social factors impact discount rates. [17] examins how the business cycles in
the U.S. affects the rate of time preference. Therefore it appears natural to assume that discount
rates vary with the state of economy (so are regime dependent).
Non constant discount rates lead to time inconsistency of the decision maker. The resolution
is to consider subgame perfect strategies. These are strategies which are optimal to implement
now given that they will be implemented in the future. Ekeland and Lazrak [6] consider a de-
terministic problem with continuous time, namely the Ramsey problem of economic growth with
non-exponential discounting. They define subgame perfect strategies and characterize them by a
generalized HJB (the non local extension of HJB). Ekeland and Pirvu [7] look at the Merton prob-
lem with special types of non-constant deterministic discount rates, and introduced/characterize
subgame perfect strategies. [8] extends [7] by allowing general non-constant deterministic dis-
count rates and life insurance acquisition in their model. Related works are done in [12], [13] and
[14]. [2] develops a general theory for stochastic control problems which are time inconsistent
and introduced the subgame perfect subgame perefect tstrategies in a fairly general stochastic
framework. Bjo¨rk, Murgoci and Zhou [3] look at the mean variance problem with time changing
risk aversion which is also time inconsistent.
In this paper, unlike previous works we consider a stochastic discount rates framework. The
goal is to characterize the subgame perfect strategies. The methodology developed in [8] is
employed to achieve this; it mixes the idea of value function (from the dynamic programming
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principle) with the idea that in the future “optimal trading strategies” are to be implemented
(from the maximum principle of Pontryagin). The new twist in our paper is the Markov chain,
and the mathematical ingredient used is Itoˆ’s formula for the Markov-modulated diffusions. Thus,
we obtain a system of four equations: first equation says that the value function is equal to
the continuation utility of subgame perfect strategies; second equation is the wealth equation
generated by subgame perfect strategies; the last two equations relate the value function to the
subgame perfect strategies. The end result is a complicated system of PDEs, SDE and a nonlinear
equation with a nonlocal term which can be solved for CRRA type utility. In this case we find an
ansatz for the value function ( by disentangling the time, the space and the Markov chain state
component). This leads to subgame perfect strategies which are time/state dependent and linear
in wealth. If constant discount rates, we notice that subgame perfect strategies coincide with the
optimal ones. In a remark we discuss the pre-commitment strategies; these are strategies that a
decision maker would implement if there exists a commitment mechanism.
Our contribution is to show that stochastic rates of time preference lead to time inconsistent
optimal strategies. Moreover, our resolution is to characterize subgame perfect strategies which
are a substitute for the optimal strategies within this context. The contributions of this paper
are: first, to consider a model with stochastic discount rates, and for the special case of CRRA
preference to compare by numerical experiments subgame perfect strategies and pre-commitment
strategies.
Numerical findings show the dependence on the model’s parameters of the subgame perfect
strategies and pre-commitment strategies. In one example we notice that a higher discount rate
leads to a higher subgame perfect consumption rate; in another example we show that this is not
the case if we allow the market parameters to switch.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follow. In section 2 we describe the model and
formulate the objective. Section 3 contains the main result. Section 4 considers the special case of
CRRA preferences. Section 5 presents a numerical experiment. The paper ends with an appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The Financial Market
Consider a probability space (Ω, {Ft}0≤t≤T ,F ,P), which accommodates a standard Brownian
motion W = {W (t), t ≥ 0} and a homogeneous finite state continuous time Markov Chain (MC)
J = {J(t), t ≥ 0}. For simplicity assume that MC takes values in S = {0,1}. Our results hold
true in the more general situation of S having finitely many states. The filtration {Ft}0≤t≤∞ is
the completed filtration generated by {W (t)}t∈[0,∞) and {J(t)}t∈[0,∞), that is Ft = F
J
t
∨
FWt .
We assume that the stochastic processes W and J are independent. The MC J has a generator
Λ = [λij ]S×S with λij ≥ 0 for i 6= j, and
∑
j∈S λij = 0 for every i ∈ S.
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In our setup the financial market consists of a bank account B and a risky asset S, that are
traded continuously over a finite time horizon [0, T ] (here T ∈ (0,∞) is an exogenously given
deterministic time). The price process of the bank account and risky asset are governed by the
following Markov-modulated SDE:
dB(t) = r(t, J(t))B(t)dt,
dS(t) = S(t) [α(t, J(t)) dt+ σ(t, J(t)) dW (t)] , 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞,
where B(0) = 1 and S(0) = s > 0 are the initial prices. The functions r(t, i), α(t, i), σ(t, i) : i ∈ S,
are assumed to be deterministic, positive and continuous in t. They represent the riskless rate,
the stock return and the stock volatility (given the state i of the MC at t). Moreover
µ(t, i) , α(t, i) − r(t, i)
stands for the stock excess return.
2.2 Investment-consumption strategies and wealth processes
In our model, an investor continuously invests in the stock, bond and consumes. Let π(t) be the
dollar value invested in stock at time t and c(t) ≥ 0 be the consumption. Xu(t) , X(t) represents
the wealth of the investor at time t associated with the trading strategy u = (π, c); it satisfies the
following stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dXu(t) = (r(t, J(t))Xu(t) + µ(t, J(t))π(t)− c(t)) dt + σ(t, J(t))π(t) dW (t), (2.1)
where X(0) = x > 0 is the initial wealth and J0 = i ∈ S is the initial state. This SDE is called
the self-financing condition. An acceptable investment-consumption strategy is defined below:
Definition 2.1. An R2-valued stochastic process {u(t) := (π(t), c(t))}t∈[0,∞) is called an admis-
sible strategy process and write u ∈ A if it is Ft− progressively measurable and it satisfies the
following integrability condition
E[
∫ t
0
|π(s)µ(s, J(s)) − c(s)| ds +
∫ t
0
|π(s)σ(s, J(s))|2 ds] <∞, a.s., for all , t ∈ [0,∞). (2.2)
and
Xu(t) > 0, c(t) > 0, t ∈ [0, T ], E sup
{t≤s≤T}
|U(c(s))| <∞, E|U(Xu(T ))| <∞. (2.3)
Here U is a utility function and is defined in the next subsection.
Under the regularity condition (2.2) imposed on {π(t), c(t)}t∈[0,∞) above, the SDE (2.1) admits
a unique strong solution.
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2.3 The risk preferences
A utility function U is a strictly increasing, strictly concave differentiable real-valued function
defined on [0,∞) which satisfies the Inada conditions
U ′(0) , lim
x↓0
U ′(x) =∞, U ′(∞) , lim
x→∞
U ′(x) = 0. (2.4)
The strictly decreasing function U ′ maps (0,∞) onto (0,∞) and hence has a strictly decreasing
inverse I : (0,∞)→ (0,∞).
2.4 The discount rate
As we mentioned in the introduction, this paper considers stochastic discount rates. An easy
way to achieve this is to let the discount rate depend on the state of the MC. Thus, at some
intermediate time t ∈ [0, T ] the discount rate is ρJ(t), for some positive constants ρ0 and ρ1. The
intuition of this way of modeling discount rates stems from the connection between market states
and discount rates (this can be explained by some models with endogenous discount rates which
are influenced by economic factors).
2.5 The Risk Criterion
In our model, the investor decides what investment/consumption strategy to choose according to
the expected utility risk criterion. Thus, investor’s goal is to maximize utility of intertemporal
consumption and final wealth. The novelty here is that we allow investor to update the risk
criterion and to reconsider the optimal strategies she/he computed in the past. This will lead to a
time inconsistent behaviour as we show below. Let the agent start with a given positive wealth x,
and a given market state i, at some instant t. The t−optimal trading strategy {π˜t(s), c˜t(s)}s∈[t,T ]
is chosen to maximize the time t optimization criterion
E
[∫ T
t
e−ρi(s−t)U(c(s)) ds + e−ρi(T−t)U(X(T ))|X(t) = x, J(t) = i
]
. (2.5)
Throughout the paper we denote Ex,it [] , E [|X(t) = x, J(t) = i] . The optimal t−trading strategy
{π˜t(s), c˜t(s)}s∈[t,T ] is derived by the supermartingale/martingale principle. In the following t
stands for the initial time and s stands for the time to go, i.e., s ∈ [t, T ]. Let V (t, s, x, i) be the
value function associated with maximizing the time t criterion
sup
u∈A
E
[∫ T
t
e−ρi(s−t)U(c(s)) ds + e−ρi(T−t)U(X(T ))|X(t) = x, J(t) = i
]
.
This is characterized by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
∂V
∂s
(t, s, x, i) + sup
π,c
[
(rx+ µπ − c)
∂V
∂x
(t, s, x, i) +
1
2
σ2π2
∂2V
∂x2
(t, s, x, i) + U(c)
]
(2.6)
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−ρiV (t, s, x, i) +
∑
j∈S
λijV (t, s, x, j) = 0,
with the boundary condition
V (t, T, x, i) = U(x). (2.7)
Here i stands for the value of MC at time t. Thus, the HJB depends on the current time t through
ρJ(t) and this dependence is inherited by the t−optimal trading strategy. This in turn leads to
time inconsistencies. Let us detail on this; if at time 0 the market state is 0, that is J(0) = 0,
the HJB equation (2.6) depends on ρ0, leading to the corresponding time 0-optimal consumption
strategy (which depends on ρ0 through the first order conditions) c˜
ρ0 ; if at a later point in time
t1 the market state is 1, that is J(t1) = 1, the HJB equation (2.6) depends on ρ1, leading to
the corresponding optimal consumption strategy (which depends on ρ1 through the first order
conditions) c˜ρ1 ; The time inconsistency is due to the fact that time 0-optimal strategy fails to
remain optimal, i.e., c˜ρ0(t) 6= c˜ρ1(t) for t ≥ t1. Notice that the value function V depends on two
time points t and s. In the case of constant rate of time preference (ρ0 = ρ1 = ρ), the time 0
optimization criterion is
sup
u∈A
E
[∫ T
0
e−ρsU(c(s))ds + e−ρTU(X(T ))|X(0) = x, J(0) = i
]
,
and the time t optimization criterion is
sup
u∈A
E
[∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)U(c(s))ds + e−ρ(T−t)U(X(T ))|X(t) = x, J(t) = i
]
.
Thus, the time 0-optimal strategy is also optimal for time t optimization criterion. This is no
longer the case if ρ0 6= ρ1, and J(0) 6= J(t).
One resolution of time inconsistency is to introduce subgame perfect strategies. They are
optimal now given that they will be implemented in the future.
3 The Main Result
3.1 The subgame perfect trading strategies
For an admissible strategy {u(t) , π(t), c(t)}t∈[0,T ] and its corresponding wealth process {X
u(t)}t∈[0,T ]
given by (2.1), we denote the expected utility functional by
Θ(t, x, i, π, c) , Ex,it
[∫ T
t
e−ρi(s−t)U(c(s)) ds + e−ρi(T−t)U(Xu(T ))
]
. (3.8)
Following [7] we shall give a rigorous mathematical formulation of the subgame perefect strategies
in the formal definition below.
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Definition 3.1. Let F = (F1, F2) : [0, T ]×R
+×S → R+×S be a map such that for any t, x > 0
and i ∈ S
lim inf
ǫ↓0
Θ(t, x, i, F1, F2)−Θ(t, x, i, πǫ, cǫ)
ǫ
≥ 0, (3.9)
where
Θ(t, x, i, F1, F2) , Θ(t, x, i, π¯, c¯),
π¯(s) , F1(s, X¯(s), J(s)), c¯(s) , F2(s, X¯(s), J(s)), (3.10)
and {π¯(s), c¯(s)}s∈[t,T ] is admissible. Here, the process {X¯(s)}s∈[t,T ] is the wealth corresponding to
{π¯(s), c¯(s)}s∈[t,T ]. The process {πǫ(s), cǫ(s)}s∈[t,T ] is another admissible investment-consumption
strategy defined by
πǫ(s) =

π¯(s), s ∈ [t, T ]\Eǫ,tπ(s), s ∈ Eǫ,t, (3.11)
cǫ(s) =

c¯(s), s ∈ [t, T ]\Eǫ,tc(s), s ∈ Eǫ,t, (3.12)
with Eǫ,t = [t, t + ǫ]; {π(s), c(s)}s∈Eǫ,t is any trading strategy for which {πǫ(s), cǫ(s)}s∈[t,T ] is an
admissible strategy. If (3.9) holds true, then {π¯(s), c¯(s)}s∈[t,T ] is a subgame perfect strategy.
3.2 The value function
Our goal is in a first step to characterize the subgame perfect strategies and then to find them
in special cases. Inspired by [7], the value function v : [0, T ] × R+ × S → R is a C1,2 function,
concave in the second variable defined by
v(t, x, i) , Ex,it
[∫ T
t
e−ρi(s−t)U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))) ds + e
−ρi(T−t)U(X¯(T ))
]
. (3.13)
Recall that {X¯(s)}s∈[0,T ] is the wealth process corresponding to {π¯(s), c¯(s)}s∈[t,T ], so it solves the
SDE
dX¯(s) = [r(s, J(s))X¯(s) + µ(s, J(s))F1(s, X¯(s), J(s)) − F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))]ds (3.14)
+ σ(s, J(s))F1(s, X¯(s))dW (s).
Moreover, F = (F1, F2) is defined by
F1(t, x, i) , −
µ(t, i)∂v
∂x
(t, x, i)
σ2(t, i)∂
2v
∂x2
(t, x, i)
, F2(t, x, i) ,
(
∂v
∂x
(t, x, i)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ], (3.15)
(recall that I is the inverse marginal utility). Thus, the value function is characterized by a system
of four equations: one integral equation with nonlocal term (3.13), one SDE (3.14) and two PDEs
(3.15). Of course the existence of such a function v satisfying the equations above is not a trivial
issue.
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Assumption 3.2. Assume that the PDE systems
∂f
∂t
(t, s, x, i) + (r(t, i)x+ µ(t, i)F1(t, x, i) − F2(t, x, i))
∂f
∂x
(t, s, x, i)
+
σ2(t, i)F 21 (t, x, i)
2
∂2f
∂x2
(t, s, x, i)+
∑
j∈S
λijf(t, s, x, j) = 0, f(t, t, x, i) = U(F2(t, x, i)) (3.16)
∂h
∂t
(t, x, i) + (r(t, i)x + µ(t, i)F1(t, x, i) − F2(t, x, i))
∂h
∂x
(t, x, i)
+
σ2(t, i)F 21 (t, x, i)
2
∂2h
∂x2
(t, x, i) +
∑
j∈S
λijh(t, x, j) = 0, h(T, x, i) = U(x). (3.17)
have a C1,2 solution on [0, s]×R+ ×S → R with exponential growth. Here t < s ≤ T, and i ∈ S.
Moreover assume that the SDE (3.14) has a solution and that {π¯(s), c¯(s)}s∈[0,T ] given by (3.10)
with (F1, F2) of (3.15) is admissible.
In the light of this assumption and by the Feyman-Kac Theorem it follows that
f(t, s, x, i) = Ex,it [U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s)))], h(t, x, i) = E
x,i
t [U(X¯(T ))].
By (3.13)
v(t, x, i) =
∫ T
t
e−ρi(s−t)f(t, s, x, i) ds + e−ρi(T−t)h(t, x, i). (3.18)
Let us also define
v¯(t, x, i) ,
∫ T
t
e−ρj(s−t)f(t, s, x, i) ds + e−ρj(T−t)h(t, x, i), i, j ∈ S. (3.19)
The next Lemma expresses the integral equation (3.13) as a system of PDEs.
Lemma 3.3. The value function v solves the following system of PDEs (four equations)
∂v
∂t
(t, x, i)+(r(t, i)x+µ(t, i)F1(t, x, i)−F2(t, x, i))
∂v
∂x
(t, x, i)+
σ2(t, i)F 21 (t, x, i)
2
∂2v
∂x2
(t, x, i) (3.20)
+U(F2(t, x, i)) + λiiv(t, x, i) − ρiv(t, x, i) = −λij v¯(t, x, j), i, j ∈ S.
∂v¯
∂t
(t, x, i)+(r(t, i)x+µ(t, i)F1(t, x, i)−F2(t, x, i))
∂v¯
∂x
(t, x, i)+
σ2(t, i)F 21 (t, x, i)
2
∂2v¯
∂x2
(t, x, i) (3.21)
+U(F2(t, x, i)) + λiiv¯(t, x, i) − ρj v¯(t, x, i) = −λijv(t, x, j), i, j ∈ S.
with the boundary condition v(T, x, i) = v¯(T, x, i) = U(x).
Conversely if there exists a C1,2 solution (v, v¯) on [0, T ]×R+×S → R with exponential growth
for (3.20), (3.21), then v satisfies (3.13).
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Proof: By differentiating (3.18) with respect to t we get
∂v
∂t
(t, x, i) =
∫ T
t
e−ρi(s−t)
∂f
∂t
(t, s, x, i) ds + e−ρi(T−t)
∂h
∂t
(t, x, i) + ρiv(t, x, i) − f(t, t, x, i). (3.22)
Moreover
∂v
∂x
(t, x, i) =
∫ T
t
e−ρi(s−t)
∂f
∂x
(t, s, x, i) ds + e−ρi(T−t)
∂h
∂x
(t, x, i). (3.23)
∂2v
∂x2
(t, x) =
∫ T
t
e−ρi(s−t)
∂2f
∂x2
(t, s, x, i) ds + e−ρi(T−t)
∂2h
∂x2
(t, x, i). (3.24)
In light of (3.16), (3.17), (3.22), (3.23) and (3.24) it follows that
∂v
∂t
(t, x, i) + (r(t, i)x+ µ(t, i)F1(t, x, i) − F2(t, x, i))
∂v
∂x
(t, x, i) +
σ2(t, i)F 21 (t, x, i)
2
∂2v
∂x2
(t, x, i)
+U(F2(t, x, i)) + λiiv(t, x, i) − ρiv(t, x, i) = −λij v¯(t, x, j).
Similarly we get the PDE for v¯. For the converse let us define
V (t, x, i, ρ) , Ex,it
[∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))) ds + e
−ρ(T−t)U(X¯(T ))
]
.
Then by Feyman-Kac Theorem it follows that
v(t, x, i) = V (t, x, i, ρi), v¯(t, x, i) = V (t, x, i, ρj), i, j ∈ S,
so v satisfies (3.13).

The following Theorem states the central result of our paper.
Theorem 3.4. Under Assumption 3.2 the trading strategy {π¯(s), c¯(s)}s∈[0,T ] given by (3.10) with
(F1, F2) of (3.15) is a subgame perfect strategy.
Proof: Let us define
Γv(t, x, i) ,
∂v
∂t
(t, x, i) +
(
r(t, i)x− I
(
∂v
∂x
(t, x, i)
))
∂v
∂x
(t, x, i)
−
µ2(t, i)
2σ2(t, i)
[∂v
∂x
(t, x, i)]2
∂2v
∂x2
(t, x, i)
+
∑
j∈S
λij(v(t, x, i) − v(t, x, j)) + U(F2(t, x, i)). (3.25)
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Γπ,cv(t, x, i) ,
∂v
∂t
(t, x, i) + (r(t, i)x− µ(t, i)π − c)
∂v
∂x
(t, x, i)
+
1
2
σ2(t, i)π2
∂2v
∂x2
(t, x, i) +
∑
j∈S
λij(v(t, x, i) − v(t, x, j)) + U(c). (3.26)
By (3.20)
Γv(t, x, i) = λij(v(t, x, j) − v¯(t, x, j)), i, j ∈ S.
The concavity of v and the first order conditions lead to
Γv(t, x, i) = max
{π,c}
Γπ,cv(t, x, i), (F1(t, x, i), F2(t, x, i)) = argmax
{π,c}
Γπ,cv(t, x, i). (3.27)
Let us recall that
Θ(t, x, i, F1, F2) = v(t, x, i). (3.28)
Thus
Θ(t, x, i, F1, F2)−Θ(t, x, i, πǫ, cǫ)
= Ex,it
[∫ t+ǫ
t
e−ρi(s−t)[U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))) − U(c(s))] ds
]
+ Ex,it
[∫ T
t+ǫ
e−ρi(s−t)[U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))) − U(c(s))] ds
]
+ Ex,it
[
e−ρi(T−t)(U(X¯(T ))− U(X(T )))
]
. (3.29)
In the light of inequalities (2.3) and Dominated Convergence Theorem
lim
ǫ↓0
E
x,i
t
[∫ t+ǫ
t
e−ρi(s−t)[U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))) − U(c(s))] ds
]
ǫ
= U(F2(t, x, i) − U(c(t)).
By (3.28) it follows that
E
x,i
t
[∫ T
t+ǫ
e−ρi(s−t)[U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))) − U(c(s))] ds
]
(3.30)
+ Ex,it
[
e−ρi(T−t)(U(X¯(T ))− U(X(T )))
]
= Ex,it
[
v(t+ ǫ, X¯(t+ ǫ), J(t+ ǫ))− v(t+ ǫ,X(t+ ǫ), J(t+ ǫ))
]
+ Ex,it
[
E[
∫ T
t+ǫ
(e−ρi(s−t) − e−ρJ(t+ε)(s−t))[U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))) − U(F2(s,X(s), J(s)))] ds
]
+ Ex,it
[
E[(e−ρi(T−t) − e−ρJ(t+ε)(T−t+ǫ))[U(X¯(T ))− U(X(T ))]
]
. (3.31)
By inequalities (2.3) and Dominated Convergence Theorem it follows that
10
lim
ǫ↓0
E
x,i
t
[
(e−ρi(T−t) − e−ρJ(t+ε)(T−t+ǫ))[U(X¯(T ))− U(X(T ))]
]
ε
= λij(e
−ρi(T−t) − e−ρj(T−t))Ex,it
[
[U(X¯(T ))− U(X(T ))]
]
= 0.
By the same token one can get that
lim
ǫ↓0
E
x,i
t
[∫ T
t+ǫ(e
−ρi(s−t) − e−ρJ(t+ε)(s−t))[U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))) − U(F2(s,X(s), J(s)))] ds
]
ǫ
= 0.
Itoˆ’s formula yields
E
x,i
t
[
v(t+ ǫ, X¯(t+ ǫ), J(t+ ǫ))− v(t+ ǫ,X(t+ ǫ), J(t+ ǫ))
]
= Ex,it
∫ t+ǫ
t
[Γv(s, X¯(s), J(s)) − U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))]ds − E
x,i
t
∫ t+ǫ
t
[Γπ,cv(s,X(s), J(s)) − U(c(s))]ds,
Therefore
lim
ǫ↓0
Θ(t, x, i, F1, F2)−Θ(t, x, i, πǫ, cǫ)
ǫ
= [Γv(t, x, i) − Γπ,cv(t, x, i)] ≥ 0,
(the inequality follows from (3.27)).

4 CRRA Preferences
In this section we assume that the utility is of power type, i.e., U(x) = Uγ(x) =
xγ
γ
. Let us take
advantage of the special form of the utility function to simplify the problem of finding v. When
γ 6= 0 we search for v of the form:
v(t, x, i) = g(t, i)
xγ
γ
, x ≥ 0. (4.32)
When γ = 0 (logarithmic utility) we look for v of the form
v(t, x, i) = g(t, i) log x+ l(t, i), x ≥ 0. (4.33)
The functions g(t, i) and l(t, i) are to be found. In light of equations (3.15) one gets
F1(t, x, i) =
µ(t, i)x
σ2(t, i)(1 − γ)
, F2(t, x, i) = g
1
γ−1 (t, i)x. (4.34)
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Note that the function l(t, i) does not enter the above equation so its expression is not important.
By (3.14), the associated wealth process satisfies the following SDE:
dX¯(s) =
[
r(s, J(s)) +
µ2(s, J(s))
σ2(s, J(s))(1 − γ)
− g
1
γ−1 (s, J(s))
]
X¯(s)ds
+
µ(s, J(s))
σ(s, J(s))(1 − γ)
X¯(s)dW (s). (4.35)
This is a linear SDE which can be easily solved. By plugging v of (4.32) into (3.13) (with F1, F2 of
(4.34) and X¯ of (4.35), we obtain the following system of four equations for g(t, i), g¯(t, i), i ∈ S :
∂g
∂t
(t, i)+ [γr(t, i)+
µ2(t, i)γ
2σ2(t, i)(1 − γ)
−ρi]g(t, i)+λiig(t, i)+(1−γ)g
γ
γ−1 (t, i) = −λij g¯(t, j), (4.36)
∂g¯
∂t
(t, i) + [γr(t, i) +
µ2(t, i)γ
2σ2(t, i)(1 − γ)
− ρj ]g¯(t, i) + λiig¯(t, i) + (1− γ)g
1
γ−1 (t, i)g¯(t, i) = −λijg(t, j),
(4.37)
with the final condition g(T, i) = g¯(T, i) = 1, i ∈ S. Next we show that there exists a unique
solution for this ODE system. Let us summarize
Lemma 4.1. There exists a unique continuously differentiable uniformly bounded solution
g(t, i), g¯(t, i), i ∈ S for the system (4.36) and (4.37). Furthermore, v(t, x, i) = g(t, i)x
γ
γ
is a value
function, meaning that v is continuously differentiable, concave in x and satisfies (3.13) with
F1, F2 of (4.34) and X¯ of (4.35).
Appendix A. proves this Lemma.

Theorem 4.2. The trading strategy {π¯(s), c¯(s)}s∈[0,T ] given by
π¯(s) =
µ(s, J(s))X¯(s)
σ2(s, J(s))(1 − γ)
, c¯(s) = g
1
γ−1 (s, J(s))X¯(s), (4.38)
is a subgame perfect strategy.
Proof: Let us notice that the boundedness of g and the fact that X¯ of (4.35) is positive and it
has finite moments of any order imply the acceptability of {π¯(s), c¯(s)}s∈[0,T ]. Next, the conclusion
follows from Theorem 3.4.

Remark 4.3. In the case of constant discount rate, i.e., ρ0 = ρ1, the subgame perfect strategies
coincide with the optimal ones. This can be seen by looking at the equation (3.20) which is
exactly HJB (2.6) (after the first order conditions are implemented and by using v = v¯ (see (3.18)
and(3.19) ). The optimal investment and consumption problem is solved in closed form by [5]
within this framework.
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Remark 4.4. The subgame perefect investment strategy does not change relative to the Merton
model with constant discount rate; more precisely the proportion of wealth invested in the stocks
is the same as in the case of Merton model with constant discount rate. This can be explained by
the randomness of market coefficients being driven by the Markov chain only. We conjecture that
in a model with mean reverting market price of risk this result does not hold.
Remark 4.5. There are three important trading strategies:
• the subgame perfect strategy {π¯(s), c¯(s)}s∈[0,T ] (with associated wealth process {X¯(s)}s∈[0,T ]
) given by
π¯(s) =
µ(s, J(s))X¯(s)
σ2(s, J(s))(1 − γ)
, c¯(s) = g
1
γ−1 (s, J(s))X¯(s),
• two pre-commitment strategies corresponding to the two discount rates ρ0, ρ1 (with associated
wealth process {Xˆk(s)}s∈[0,T ], k = 1, 2 ) which are optimal at time 0, but fail to remain
optimal afterwards; they are given by
πˆk(s) =
µ(s, J(s))Xˆk(s)
σ2(s, J(s))(1 − γ)
, cˆk(s) = gˆ
1
γ−1
k (s, J(s))Xˆk(s), k = 1, 2;
here gˆk(t, i), i, j ∈ S, k = 1, 2 solve:
∂gˆ1
∂t
(t, i)+[γr(t, i)+
µ2(t, i)γ
2σ2(t, i)(1 − γ)
−ρ0]gˆ1(t, i)+λiigˆ1(t, i)+(1−γ)gˆ
γ
γ−1
1 (t, i) = −λij gˆ1(t, j),
(4.39)
∂gˆ2
∂t
(t, i)+[γr(t, i)+
µ2(t, i)γ
2σ2(t, i)(1 − γ)
−ρ1]gˆ2(t, i)+λiigˆ2(t, i)+(1−γ)gˆ
γ
γ−1
2 (t, i) = −λij gˆ2(t, j),
(4.40)
with boundary condition gˆ1(T, i) = gˆ1(T, i), i ∈ S.
• a naive strategy that switches in between the two pre-commitment strategies.
5 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we use Matlab’s powerful ODE solvers (especially the functions ode23 and ode45)
to perform numerical experiments. We numerically solve ODE systems (4.36), (4.39) and (4.40)
to get the subgame perfect and pre-commitment strategies. We take the Markov Chain generator
to be (
−2 2
1.5 −1.5
)
We plot the subgame perfect and pre-commitment consumption rates denoted by
C¯(t, J(t)) ,
F2(t, X¯(t), J(t))
X¯(t)
= g
1
γ−1 (t, J(t)),
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Cˆk(t, J(t)) ,
cˆk(t)
Xˆk(t)
= gˆ
1
γ−1
k (t, J(t)), k = 1, 2.
Fig. 1. Subgame perfect and pre-commitment consumption rates for µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = 0.1, σ0 =
0.2, σ1 = 0.2, r0 = 0.05, r1 = 0.05; the discount rates ρ0 = 0.3, ρ1 = 0.06.
Fig. 2. Subgame perfect and pre-commitment consumption rates for µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = 0.1, σ0 =
0.2, σ1 = 0.2, r0 = 0.01, r1 = 0.09; the discount rates ρ0 = 0.07, ρ1 = 0.06.
Remark 5.1. Numerical findings reveal the complex dependence of the subgame perfect and pre-
commitment consumption rates on the model parameters. In figure 1 we have the same market
coefficients on the two states and a higher discount rate on the first state. This leads to higher
subgame perfect consumption rate in the first state (in figure 1 notice that C¯(t,1) = Cˆ2(t,0) =
Cˆ2(t,1). In figure 2 we also let the interest rate depend on the regime. Here although
ρ0 = 0.07 > ρ1 = 0.06,
C¯(t,1) > C¯(t,0). The difference between different consumption rates becomes more pronounced
for higher γ.
6 Appendix
6.1 A. Proof of Lemma 4.1
Existence and uniqueness for the ODE system is granted locally in time. For global existence and
uniqueness we eastablish global estimates. Let α(t, i) = −
[
γr(t, i) + µ
2(t,i)γ
2σ2(t,i)(1−γ)
− ρi + λii
]
, i ∈
S, and α¯(t, i) = −
[
γr(t, i) + µ
2(t,i)γ
2σ2(t,i)(1−γ)
− ρj + λii
]
, i, j ∈ S. Then from the ODE system we get
∂g
∂t
(t, i)− α(t, i)g(t, i) ≤ 0,
∂g¯
∂t
(t, i)− α¯(t, i)g¯(t, i) ≤ 0, i ∈ S.
Integrating this from t to T and using g(T, i) = g¯(T, i) = 1, i ∈ S we get a global lower bound
M > 0 for g, g¯. Next, since γ < 1, from the ODE system
∂g
∂t
(t, i) ≥ (α(t, i) − (1− γ)M
γ
γ−1 )g(t, i) − λij g¯(t, j), i, j ∈ S,
∂g¯
∂t
(t, j) ≥ (α¯(t, j) − (1− γ)M
γ
γ−1 )g¯(t, j)− λjig(t, i), i, j ∈ S.
Let A(t, i, j) , min (α(t, i) − (1− γ)M
γ
γ−1 , α¯(t, j) − (1− γ)M
γ
γ−1 ), λ(i, j) , max (λij , λji). Let
h(t) , g(t, i) + g¯(t, j). Then by adding the above inequalities we get
∂h
∂t
(t) ≥ (A(t, i, j) − λ(i, j))h(t).
Integrating this from t to T yields the desired upper bound.
Recall that v(t, x, i) = g(t, i)x
γ
γ
, and define v¯ by v¯(t, x, i) , g¯(t, i)x
γ
γ
. Then it can be easily
shown that (v, v¯) solves (3.20), (3.21). Then by Lemma 3.3, v satisfies (3.13).
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